1.
The Informational privacy is the ability to determine for yourself when others may collect and how they may use your information. 1 Adequate informational privacy requires a sufficiently broad ability to control collection and use, and this requires a sufficiently broad ability to give or 1 ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967 AND CONVENIENCE 3 (2007) (defining privacy "as the exercise of an authentic option to withhold information on oneself"); Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 REV. , 1462 REV. (2000 ("I will use 'informational privacy' as shorthand for the ability to control the acquisition or release of information about oneself"); Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) ("both the common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual's control of information concerning his or her person").
withhold free and informed consent to proposed collections and uses; otherwise, you cannot
determine for yourself what others do with your information.
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Notice and Choice (sometimes called Notice and Consent 3 ) is the current paradigm for securing free and informed consent to business's online data collection and use practices. 4 The "notice" is a presentation of terms. The "choice" is an action signifying acceptance of the terms (typically using the site or clicking on an "I agree" button). 5 When the notice contains information about a business's data collection and use, the argument for Notice and Choice rests on two claims. First: when adequately implemented, Notice and Choice ensures that website visitors can give free and informed consent to businesses' data collection and use practices.
Second: the combined effect of the individual consent decisions is an acceptable overall tradeoff between privacy and the benefits of information processing. 6 There are well-known, compelling 2 We do not distinguish between personally identifying information (PII) and non-PII, because recent advances in de-anonymization . For additional references, see infra note 8. 5 As Paul Schwartz notes, "when a Web site says something about its data processing practices-even if this statement is vague or reveals poor practice-the visitor to the site is deemed to be in agreement with these practices so long as she sticks around. This summary, despite its ironic tone, is no exaggeration." Paul Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 22 CONN. L. REV. 815, 82425 (2000) . 6 The tradeoff claim is rarely explicit in the literature arguing for Notice and Choice. See infra text accompanying notes 37 -40.
critiques of both claims. 7 Policy makers and privacy advocates nonetheless typically insist on adherence to Notice and Choice. 8 The Federal Trade Commission, for example, recently endorsed it and provided guidelines for its implementation. A policeman sees a drunk man searching for something under a streetlight and asks what the drunk has lost. He says he lost his keys and they both look under the streetlight. After a few minutes the policeman asks if he is sure he lost them here, and the drunk replies, no, that he lost them in the park. The policeman asks why he is searching here, and the drunk replies, "This is where the light is."
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Policy makers and privacy advocates search under streetlight of Notice and Choice even though consent not there. Why don't they look in the "park"? Most likely, they see no need to do so.
We find the critiques of Notice and Choice conclusive, but our assessment is far from widely shared-and understandably so. The criticisms are scattered over several articles and books.
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No one has unified them and answered the obvious counterarguments. We do so. Making the critique plain, however, is not enough to move policy makers from the "streetlight" to the "park."
The critiques are entirely negative; they do not point to an alternative, a "park" in which to search for consent. As Helen Nissenbaum notes, "Why exactly the existing transparency-and- why your pharmacist may inquire about the drugs you are taking, but not about whether you are happy in your marriage. When appropriate norms govern online exchanges, they ensure that visitors give free and informed consent, and they also implement an acceptable tradeoff between privacy and competing concerns.
Critiques are most effective when they undermine their targets' strongest points; accordingly, we begin with a review of the arguments for Notice and Choice. Discussions of Notice and Choice typically pay little, if any, explicit attention to its underlying rationale, 13 so our review sometimes, of necessity, extrapolates arguments as much as it reports them. We present these arguments in Section I. Section II contains our critique of Notice and Choice. We present our norm-based alternative in Section III and conclude in Section IV will a call to study norms and their role in ensuring free and informed consent.
I. The Allure of Notice and Choice
The allure of Notice and Choice is that it appears with one elegant stroke to ensure that consent is informed and free and thereby also to implement an acceptable tradeoff between privacy and competing concerns. 14 We start with the argument that Notice and Choice secures informed consent.
13 Noteworthy exceptions include RADIN, supra note 7; RULE, supra note 1. 14 Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove note that Notice and Choice was initially adopted in response to the promulgation of the Fair Information Practices (FIPs). Those practices require "(1) transparency of record systems, (2) collection and use of information that is accurate, relevant, and up to-date (data quality principle), (3) notice about what information was being collected about individuals, (4) a right to prevent information collected for one purpose from being used for other purposes, (5) a right to access one's personal information, (6) a right to correct erroneous information, and (7) data security protections." They contend that "In contrast to Europe, where the FIPs were highly influential and led to omnibus privacy protections, the United States has adopted a more market-driven approach toward regulating consumer privacy. Businesses and marketers pushed the notice and choice approach, which selectively adopts only a few FIPs. Only the third FIP listed above survives in the notice and choice approach. pedigree, the duty to read has caused considerable academic concern. 23 We nonetheless assume for the sake of argument that the "duty to read interpretation" of informed consent is correct.
Our point, which we will develop in Section II, is that Notice and Choice fails to ensure informed consent even when we grant that hypothetical knowledge is sufficient to make consent informed.
B. argues that only actual knowledge can fulfill the "knowing understanding" requirement, 26 and she concludes that visitors' consent is not free on the ground that non-reading visitors have only hypothetical knowledge of the terms in Notices. As important as it is, we will not pursue this point. We grant for the sake of argument that hypothetical knowledge fulfills the "knowing understanding" requirement. Our critique is that it is still problematic to regard consent as free.
The background for that critique is the following argument in favor of the claim that consent is
free. An example is helpful. worth more to her than not disclosing her data, how can the action be mere passive acquiescence?
C.
Summing to an Acceptable Tradeoff Living in a highly digitized society entails a tradeoff between informational privacy and the benefits of information processing. The credit system is a good example. The billions of credit, debit, and bank cards testify to consumers' embrace of the system, which does indeed offer significant benefits.
The expansion of credit reporting, along with improvements in credit scoring, has facilitated substantial expansion in the availability of credit to American consumers, as well as the democratization of credit. Credit grantors can make more expeditious decisions, often without a personal visit to a loan officer, enabling the phenomenon of "instant credit" and offering significant benefits to consumers as a group.
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Consumers opt for the benefits even though, "[u]nlike many other countries, credit reporting in the US is 'full file' or 'comprehensive' reporting, including both positive and negative information about consumers." 30 In general, studies show that consumers find it acceptable to
give up some degree of privacy to get the benefits of information processing. As Harris Poll reports, almost two-thirds of all adults (64%) are . . . often willing to allow people to have access to, and to use, their personal information where they understand the reasons for its use, where they see tangible benefits for so doing and when they believe care is taken to prevent the misuse of this information. Even with the simple picture, the balancing task is immense. The benefits and risks affect society as whole. Increasing the availability of relevant information and innovative platforms for communication may, for example, yield a better informed and more politically involved citizenry. Increasing privacy risks may create a chilling effect that stunts rather than encourages the free exchange of ideas and opinions. Improving the personalization of services requires collecting, analyzing, and retaining information that may be also be used for a variety of other purposes-to engage in price discrimination, or to determine whether someone qualifies for a credit card, mortgage, health insurance, or appointment as a Supreme Court Justice, for example. Price discrimination, the extension of credit, the distribution of health insurance, and the composition of the Supreme Court determine in part which segments of society have access to what goods and services, and that distribution of goods and services has long-term effects on the type of society that evolves, and on whether it distributes benefits and imposes risks fairly.
Ideally, an acceptable balance is one that cannot be improved, one that is at least as good as any other possible balance. The balancing task is so complex that practice only approximates the ideal, and the sensible demand is for a sufficiently close approximation the ideal. The balancing task is further complicated by the fact that disagreement on balancing questions is the order of the day. As James data collected, the purposes for which it is used, and the third parties with which it is shared. This is why Nissenbaum asks one to "consider what might need to be conveyed to users to provide notice of what information is captured, where it is sent, and how it is used." 51 The system is so complex that any attempt to trace what information is collected, the purposes for which it used, and where it goes is "so complicated that probably only a handful of deep experts would be able to piece together a full account." 52 This makes it difficult to make a Notice sufficiently informative. It is practically impossible because the advertising ecosystem has a "recursive capacity that is indefinitely extensible" 53 so that even an accurate "snapshot of the information flows" 54 is valid only for a short time.
The inference from complexity to impossibility leans heavily on the specificity assumption requirement that a Notice must provide sufficient detail about the workings of the current advertising ecosystem. The next impossibility argument, based on long-term data retention, does not assume that a Notice must contain specific details beyond merely identifying the purposes for which collected information is used.
Long-term retention
The advertising ecosystem collects information for one purpose and retains it for use for other unpredictable purposes in the future. The key point here is that analyzing massive collections of data reveals patterns that would otherwise go unnoticed. 60 The analysis often requires analyzing data collected and retained over long periods of time. This is why the "big data business model is antithetical to data minimization. It incentivizes collection of more data for longer periods of time. It is aimed precisely at those unanticipated secondary uses, the 'crown jewels' of big data."
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A well-known example is Dr. Russ Altman's discovered that taking the antidepressant Paxil together with the anti-cholesterol drug Pravachol could result in diabetic blood sugar levels. 62 He made two uses of big data. He obtained a symptomatic footprint characteristic of very high blood sugar levels by analyzing thirty years of reports in the Federal Drug Administration's Adverse Event Reporting System database, and then found that footprint in the Bing searches using an algorithm that detected statistically significant correlations. People taking both drugs also tended to enter search terms ("fatigue" and "headache," for example) that constitute the symptomatic footprint. This is not an isolated example. Big data analyses have reduced emergency room costs, 63 improved the treatment for cystic fibrosis, created life-saving treatment for premature babies, 64 helped combat polio in Ethiopia, 65 improved access to social services in India by creating digital IDs, 66 and improved police response times by using acoustic sensors to detect and triangulate the sound of gunfire.
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Such restrictions would also be unwise. Adopting them mean turning our backs on the benefits Big Data offers. Surely judicious balancing of risks and benefits is better. Accordingly, we reject the restrictions that would be required to give Notices a reasonable chance of being sufficiently informative. In any case, the big data genie is not about to go back in the bottle.
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Suggesting the imposition of severe restrictions on data collection and retention is about as realistic as shouting at a tidal wave that it should stop.
B. How Can Consent Be Anything But Passive Acquiescence?
The argument against Vicky's use of Amazon being passive acquiescence was that she regards using Amazon as worth more to her than surrendering her data. The problem is that it does not follow from the "worth more" judgment that her use is not mere passive acquiescence.
Compare a thief who, with a gun to your head, demands, "Your money or your life!" You hand over the money because you regard your life as being worth more than the money, but, if anything is a case of passive acquiescence, you handing over the money is. There is no gun to Vicky's head, but her choice is also highly constrained. She could use a different online book Amazon's. 69 Indeed, virtually all online sellers collect and use a significant amount of data.
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Vicky could of course only buy books from brick and mortar bookstores, but such stores are disappearing, and the ones that remain carry only a limited inventory. In any case, Vicky wants the convenience of online shopping. She could research online sellers' Notices to find those most consistent with her privacy preferences, but she is not willing to spend that much time and effort. She is already committed to a variety of goals-raising her children, pursuing her career, enjoying her friends, and so on-and the time she is willing to allot to buying books is relatively brief. So agreeing to a seller's data collection practices is her only viable option.
It does not follow however that Vicky's consent is not free. The gun to the head example notwithstanding, highly constrained choices can in some cases still be free. Imagine, for example, that your dream vacation is to go to the Cayman Islands. Your budget makes the trip impossible unless you opt for an "all inclusive" vacation package that offers airfare, hotel, and food for a single affordable price. When you sit down to eat the food, your choice is highly constrained (your options being go hungry or spend money you cannot afford), but, unlike the thief's demand, the constraint is not a profound and wholly unjustified interference with your pursuit of plans and projects which you value and to which you are committed. It is just the opposite; the constraint is a means that you freely choose in order to realize your vacation goal.
You eat the food freely in the sense that doing so is a fully justified component of a freely chosen overall plan. This is a common pattern. You may have no practical option other than driving your children to daycare. You have to work; there is no one to care for them at home; and so on. But your driving them to daycare is part of the pursuit of the freely adopted project of raising your children and as such it is not passive acquiescence but an affirmative action.
When Vicky buys from Amazon, is her constrained choice more like the gun to the head example or the daycare and Cayman Island examples? Schwartz and Solove evidently believe it is more like the gun to the head. They contend that the "choice" presented is more of a Hobson's choice than a real one. Many companies present consumers with a take-it-or-leave-it choice that provides hardly any ability for consumers to bargain about their privacy preferences. If a consumer wants to buy a product, read a website, subscribe to a magazine, use a service, and so on, the consumer can be forced either to surrender privacy or to go elsewhere. But when nearly all companies offer the same take-it-or-leave-it approach, consumers desiring to protect their privacy have nowhere to turn.
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Similarly, Todd Rakoff contends that "The consumer's experience of modern commercial life is one not of freedom in the full sense posited by traditional contract law, but rather one of submission to organizational domination, leavened by the ability to choose the organization by which he will be dominated."
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In section III, we argue that Schwartz, Solove, and Rakfoff are half right: in some cases website visitors' "Choices" are passive acquiescence; some are not.
C. Notice and Choice Leads to Unacceptable Tradeoffs
The Notice and Choice tradeoff claim is that if each person gives free and informed consent to the tradeoffs that are acceptable to that person, the overall result is some reasonably close approximation to an ideally acceptable tradeoff. It is extremely unlikely that this is true.
Our argument distinguishes two tradeoff problems. First is the simple problem, which is the problem we described earlier. to travel by car, bus, air, or train, so many choose car, bus, or air that train service was no longer profitable and the railroad ceased to offer it even though it was the only reliable form of transportation in foul weather and in peak traffic conditions. Kahn suggests the discontinuance produced an unacceptable tradeoff:
73 Alfred E. Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures, Imperfections, and The Limits of Economics, 19 KYKLOS 23-47 (1966) . 74 Ithaca (New York), WikiTravel, http://wikitravel.org/en/Ithaca_(New_York).
Suppose each person in the cities served were to ask himself how much he would have been willing to pledge regularly over some time period, say annually, by purchase of prepaid tickets, to keep rail passenger service available to his community. As long as the amount that he would have declared (to himself) would have exceeded what he actually paid on the period-and my own introspective experiment shows that it would-then to that extent the disappearance of the passenger service was an incident of market failure.
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Assuming, as Kahn does, that his reaction is representative, the lack of train service is unacceptable to most of those affected.
Notice and Choice is likely to produce a similar unacceptable result. The result in this case is the world Daniel Solove warns us we rapidly approach. He fears that we are heading toward a world where an extensive trail of information fragments about us will be forever preserved on the Internet, displayed instantly in a Google search. We will be forced to live with a detailed record beginning with childhood that will stay with us for life wherever we go, searchable and accessible from anywhere in the world. This data can often be of dubious reliability; it can be false and defamatory; or it can be true but deeply humiliating or discrediting. We may find it increasingly difficult to have a fresh start, a second chance, or a clean slate. We might find it harder to engage in self-exploration if every false step and foolish act is chronicled forever in a permanent record. This record will affect our ability to define our identities, to obtain jobs, to participate in public life, and more.
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Despite widespread disagreement about what counts as an acceptable tradeoff, we think most would find the world Solove envisions unacceptable. We think the combined effect of individual consent decisions is likely to lead to that world. We do so because we share James Rule's assessment of the plight of privacy:
Ever-emerging technological possibilities and the ingenuity of planners generate a study stream of new ways of creating, capturing, and using personal data for one institutional purpose or another. And these innovations planned or accomplished pose one challenge after another to the privacy-protecting Davids, who mobilize thinly stretched resources against organizational Goliaths. To make matters worse, there is a progressive "desensitization of publics to everyday demands on privacy. The sheer ubiquity of pressures for personal information, the variety of situations in which they occur, and the seeming lack of alternatives-all these things apparently conspire to create a sense that resistance is futile." 78 A sense of futility that results in acquiescence to increasing ever-increasing data collection and use is likely to lead the world in which "[w]e will be forced to live with a detailed record beginning with childhood that will stay with us for life wherever we go, searchable and accessible from anywhere in the world."
Even if that world does not become a reality, we find it hard to believe that the sum of individual consent decisions will yield an acceptable result. An acceptable tradeoff has to balance society-wide long-term effects. As James Rule notes, "any judgments about where and how to draw a line against endless, incremental erosion of privacy requires that most elusive of visions-a view of the whole. 78 Id. at 166. 79 Id. at 144.
The real tradeoff problem
The simple tradeoff problem is no longer the actual problem. "Big data" is a primary reason. Big Data offers a much wider range of both risks and benefits than are present in the simple tradeoff. Our earlier examples are sufficient to illustrate the breadth of the benefitsfrom detecting drug interactions to reducing emergency room costs to improving police response times. 80 As even our very short list illustrates, the benefits are extraordinarily diverse.
Moreover, one very important range of benefits is perhaps the one hardest to predict: new products and services. As the World Economic Forum has observed, personal data "will emerge as a new asset class touching all aspects of society." 81 The risks are equally broad and diverse.
Big Data and Big Data analytics expand the range of possibilities, and making those possibilities realities typically creates both benefits and risks. The loss of informational privacy remains a key concern, but there is a wide range of other risks. For example, using digital IDs to improve access to social services in India will increase the demand for such services. Meeting the demand will mean an increased investment in those services, and that will have complex positive and negative effects on the Indian economy
The "view of the whole" 82 visitors need to make acceptable tradeoffs among such a complex array of benefits and risk far exceeds the view needed for the-already extremely difficult-task of balancing a short list of benefits against the loss of informational privacy.
Visitors do not have the relevant information, nor do they generally have the expertise or experience required to make the complex tradeoffs involved. Thus, there is no reason to think that the individual consent decisions would sum to an acceptable outcome. 
III. Beyond Notice and Choice
We see no acceptable way to rescue Notice and Choice. We think an alternative is necessary, and that informational norms provide it. Informational norms
[g]enerally . . . circumscribe the type or nature of information about various individuals that, within a given context, is allowable, expected, or even demanded to be revealed. In medical contexts, it is appropriate to share details of our physical condition or, more specifically, the patient shares information about his or her physical condition with the physician but not vice versa; among friends we may pour over romantic entanglements (our own and those of others); to the bank or our creditors, we reveal financial information; with our professors, we discuss our own grades; at work, it is appropriate to discuss work-related goals and the details and quality of performance.
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When informational norms govern online businesses data collection and use practices, website visitors give free and informed consent to acceptable tradeoffs. 84 Or rather, they do as long as the norms have the property that we call being value-optimal. We will first introduce the notion of value-optimality and then explain why, if there are value-optimal informational norms governing websites, then visitors give free and informed consent to acceptable tradeoffs. Our explanation is brief. So much so that we may seem open to Bertrand Russell's objection that "[t]he method of 'postulating' what we want has many advantages; they are the same as the advantages of theft over honest toil." 85 Our reply is that we are neither thieving nor toiling. We are indicating where to toil, indicating the "park" in which to look for free and informed consent.
A. Value-Optimality A norm is value-optimal when, in light of the values of members of the group in which the norm obtains, the norm is at least as well justified as any alternative. 86 A norm that is at least as well justified as any alternative is either better justified than any alternative, or is tied with one or more alternatives that are also better than the rest. The point is that there is no better alternative. There are many optimality notions; Pareto optimality is perhaps the most wellknown.
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Appeal to value-optimality allows us to define the ideal of norm completeness. Normcompleteness holds for transactions between visitors and online businesses when there is no significant tradeoff between privacy and competing goals that is not governed by at least one value-optimal informational norm. 88 Three further points about norm-completeness clarify its role.
85 BETRAND RUSSELL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY 71 (1920) . 86 We do not mean to suggest that people explicitly think that conformity to the norm is at least as well justified as any alternative. Typically, people just unreflectively conform to the norm. The point is that one could justify conformity if one reflected on the norm under ideal conditions (including having sufficient time, sufficient information, lack of bias, and so on). We also put aside the issue of how many members of a group have to conform for the norm to exist. We simply assume "almost all" and leave "almost" undefined. 87 A situation is Pareto optimal when, and only when, it is not possible to improve the wellbeing of any one person without making others worse off. 88 Since we allow data collected at one time to be indefinitely retained for future use, we need to introduce a temporal dimension into the definition of norm completeness. A more accurate statement would be: there is no significant tradeoff between privacy and competing goals at a given time that is not governed by at least one value-optimal informational norm existing at that time. We put aside the (important) complication that tradeoffs in the future may involve individuals who did not exist at the time the transaction was made.
First, it is plausible to assume that practice more or less approximates norm completeness for traditional, non-digital goods and services. Buyers and sellers have exchanged goods and services for centuries, and it is plausible to assume that, over the years, relevant value-optimal norms have evolved. 89 A critical concern that we address below is that rapid advances in technology have outstripped the relatively slow evolution of norms and created novel situations for which we lack relevant value-optimal informational norms. 
B. Acceptable Tradeoffs
All informational norms-value-optimal and non-value-optimal alike-implement a tradeoff between privacy and competing concerns. They permit some information processing, and thus secure some of its benefits, but they protect privacy by allowing only certain processing. When the norm is value-optimal, the tradeoff it implements it is justified by visitors'
values (with no alternative that better justified). The tradeoff is acceptable in this sense.
C. Why Consent is Informed A visitor's consent is informed if the visitor can make a reasonable evaluation of the risks and benefits of disclosing information. Visitors easily meet this requirement as long as norm completeness holds. Norm-completeness ensures that every transaction is governed by appropriate value-optimal norms, and, as long as visitors know that their transactions are so governed, they know all they need to make a reasonable evaluation of the risks and benefits of disclosing information. They know all they need because uses of the visitor's information-both uses now and uses in the unpredictable future-will implement tradeoffs between privacy and competing goals that are not only entirely consistent with their values. Surely, that is enough to evaluate the risks and benefits.
Thus, when norm completeness holds, one may reject the specificity assumption.
Informed consent does not require knowing in some detail "what information is captured, where it is sent, and how it is used." 91 Visitors just need to know that data collection and use will be consistent with relevant value-optimal norms. Some may object that this just substitutes one problem for another. The problem of finding a way to give visitors enough detailed information disappears, but another difficult problem takes its place: the problem of ensuring that appropriate value-optimal norms exist. Online data collection and analysis is one of many areas in which rapid advances in technology have outstripped the relatively slow evolution of norms and created novel situations for which we lack relevant value-optimal informational norms.
We do not disagree. Indeed, our point was precisely to replace the "knowledge of sufficient detail" problem with the problem of creating relevant value-optimal norms. We think this is where critical work needs to be done. We will return to this point shortly.
D. Why Consent Is Free
In our earlier discussion of free consent, we argued that even a highly constrained choice could be a free choice, but we left open the question of whether Vicky's constrained choice qualifies as free. Our answer is, "It depends."
It depends on whether the transaction is governed by relevant value-optimal informational norms. Assume it is. Then the norm-governed transaction give Vicky just want she wants and needs-a key time-saving means to pursue the plans and projects to which she is committed. She allots only a relatively small amount of time to purchasing books. She wants to purchase suitable books within that time and return to pursuing her other goals. She knows Amazon will process some range of personal information, and she wants an acceptable tradeoff between informational privacy and other relevant risks and benefits. The norm-governed transaction gives a ready-made value-optimal tradeoff. It is a highly efficient way for her to carry out her transaction with a minimum of attention or effort to privacy tradeoffs. Thus, as in the daycare and Cayman Islands examples, her constrained choice is the choice that fits in with her other freely pursued plans and projects and is in this way an affirmative action in the pursuit of those plans.
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We conclude that, when buyers conform to value-optimal norms, buyers give free and informed consent to the norm-implemented trade-offs.
But what happens when a transaction is not governed by relevant value-optimal norms?
Then there is no explanation of free and informed consent in terms of value-optimal norms, and, since we see no other effective mechanism for visitors to give free and informed consent, we conclude there is-as a practical matter-no effective way at all for visitors to give free and informed consent. Unfortunately this is precisely the situation website visitors face today. As we noted earlier, rapid advances in technology have created many situations for which we lack relevant value-optimal informational norms. The result is a radical failure of norm completeness. There are two ways this can and does happen: (1) relevant norms exist, but they are not value-optimal; or (2) relevant norms do not exist at all. We have discussed both cases in detail elsewhere.
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IV. A Key Task: Curing Failures of Norm Completeness
It is essential to develop a theory of norms and privacy, 94 and to find ways to generate appropriate norms when necessary. Our view happens to be that, with the notable exception of 92 Elsewhere we argued that the third condition was not fulfilled but that its lack of fulfillment did not impugn the freedom of the choice. 
